In recent years, significant efforts for improving the technical and the economic performance of smart grids have been applied with the presence of different players making decisions in these grids. This paper proposes a bilevel hierarchical structure for designing and planning distributed energy resources in home microgrids (H-MGs). Such a small-scale grid inside the market environment permits energy exchange among distributed energy resources and home microgrids through a pool market. In this paper, each home microgrid's planner maximizes the performance of distributed energy resources while exchanging energy with other H-MGs. The problem is formulated as a high-level problem decomposed into a set of low-level market clearing problems. The global optimal performance in terms of energy cost is met for a market structure (H-MGs, consumers, and retailers) at a Nash optimum point for the formulated scheduling game considering local and general constraints on the spot market. In general, the upper-level structure is based on H-MG generation competition for maximizing their individual and/or group income in the process of forming coalition with other H-MGs. In addition, the functionality of the lower-level of the hierarchical structure is governed by a market clearing based on the price response method by all the DERs enabling H-MGs to change the spot market strategic behavior. Prices are obtained as dual variables of power balance equations. This paper will investigate a set of bilevel games, including nonlinear programming problems solved through a complementary problem method. Using the binary theory, the bilevel hierarchical structure will be replanned using a nonlinear problem. Results prove that the proposed structure can increase the players's profit.
Introduction
Demand-side management (DSM) topics are focused on energy consumption control at the consumer side [1, 2] . Such energy control is coordinated by electric utilities, companies and enterprises without controlling distributed energy resources [3, 4] . When the latter is controlled, the topic would be defined as an energy management [5] .
demandThis objective of this paper is to first propose a base framework for the demand of consumers encompassing H-MGs, and second investigate profits that can be made from operating H-MGs independently or in a coalitional structure in a daily electricity market [6, 7] . For these purposes, energy exchange among H-MGs is formulated as a scheduling game. In this paper, competitive monopolies are modeled and simulated in a formulated convex optimization problem [8, 9] . These monopolies are based on three contradictory objectives: H-MGs's and retailers's income maximization, consumers's cost reduction, and demand peak reduction [10] .
With the aim of a convex optimization problem, a bilevel hierarchical interactive architecture (BL-HIA) algorithm on the condition of reaching a maximum profit is proposed for both consumer and the power generator side [11, 12] . The optimum performance problem is presented for all DERs existing in multiple H-MGs as a BL-HIA so that it is a mixed integer programming problem [13, 14] . The upper-level targets maximizing H-MGs's profit through energy exchange among H-MGs as well as H-MGs and retailers for a central optimal performance of a decision maker [14, 15] . On the other hand, the lower-level of the hierarchal structure of the problem represents an equilibrium problem incorporating DSM for an optimal performance of multiple H-MGs [1, 5] . This way, a central optimum performance decision maker for energy optimum exchange among H-MGs with each other and with retailers in an independent and a coalitional performance and with the aim of reaching H-MGs's maximum profit is included at an upper-level decision maker while considering an independent or a coalitional performance of all H-MGs [16] [17] [18] . The interaction between the two levels of the hierarchal structure of the game is a factor of searching for the optimal solution at both levels [4, 5] . Considering the optimal scheduling of all H-MGs and DERs existing in them in Multiple H-MGs requires solving mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) equivalent to bilevel problem. This bilevel problem can be looked at as a multiple-leadercommon-follower game. The aim of implementing this game structure is finding a final equilibrium point in which none of H-MGs and consumers can increase their profit by changing in the generation and the consumption schedules. Furthermore, the BL-HIA structure accounts for decisions resulting from forming a coalition among H-MGs to maximize the profit and also exchange energy among them.
The contribution in this work can be summarized as follows: First, the proposed BL-HIA structure is preferable over the proposed structure in [19] as it is a multi-ownership structure that permits, forming coalition among H-MGs and explicitly increasing the competition among H-MGs and consumers rather than an independent operation of H-MGs. Second, the BL-HIA is adequate for modelling problems with several leaders (i.e., H-MGs) having their own individual objective functions when operating independently or in a coalitional manner (upper-level problem). Such a game is to optimize several followers (i.e., consumers inserted in the bilevel structure). These models are related to situations where actions and followers's performance in BL-HIA have a significant effect on decisions made by leaders. This fact is related to the case in which H-MGs's profit (a leader) depends on the amount of energy which is sold for supplying consumers existing in the power grid (as follower). The general view of the hierarchical structure and optimization problems has been shown with the proposed model in Figure. 2. Third, a better strategy maximizing consumers's satisfaction in terms of demand supply and H-MGs's profit is presented in comparison to a single level structure. Finally, the BL-HIA structure is solved by formulating an equivalent one level mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) problem deploying the KKT optimization conditions. The innovations in this paper can be summarized as follows:
1. An optimum programming solution within H-MGs generation as a BL-HIA structure; 2. Providing a multiple-leader-common-follower game which states the effectiveness of the market competition in multiple H-MGs through solving a BL-HIA structure; 3. Developing a new model for demand-side management; 4. Accommodating both DR resources and storage devices in the market operation to achieve a comprehensive solution exploiting all flexibilities; and 5. Proposing an advanced electricity market for active distribution networks based on game theory;
The Proposed BL-HIA Structure
The problem encountered by the H-MGs for an independent or a coalitional operation can be modelled as a bilevel structure that is a decision-making problem including several agents which try to optimize their corresponding objective functions on a connectable dependent set. An agent is, in fact, an object which can act as a DER or connected to other units. The BL-HIA structure is shown in Figure. 2. The upper-level problem states maximizing the profit of H-MGs having a higher priority of operating in an independent or a coalitional operation on the condition of: 1) satisfying upperlevel constraints and 2) satisfying a set of lower-level problems. H-MGs with a higher priority of operation in the upperlevel problem are identified based on their price bids. Upperlevel constraints include limits on the quantity and supply bids of DERs resources, the minimum accessible power capacity by the market regulator, and buying/selling quantities by H-MGs and retailers. Lower-level problem states the market clearing prices (MCP) with the aim of maximizing the profit of H-MGs having lower priority of operation subject to meeting equilibrium constraints for each H-MG, generation/consumption limits, and the number of consumers participating in the DSM program.
As it is observed in Figure. 2, the higher priority of H-MGs operation (in an independent or a coalitional operation) is defined by the energy excess/shortage gap and supply/demand bids that permits a maximization of an expected profit. Maximizing the profit of each H-MG is achieved by considering the fact that each agent at the lower-level problem shows an optimal operation in correspondence to the income of H-MGs with higher priority of operation based on the offered price. This optimal operation includes an estimation of the demand supplied and shifted by each consumer in an independent or a coalitional operation. It must be emphasized that the competition among H-MGs with higher and lower priority (or competitor H-MGs) are explicitly modelled at upper and lower-levels. It must be noted that upper-level and lower-level problems shown in Figure. 2 become related to each other. In other words, lower-level problems estimate the price and the quantity of competitor H-MGs which directly affect the profit of H-MGs inserted in the above problem. In other words, decisions related to forming a coalition and taking a bidding strategy by the competitor strategic H-MGs in the upper-level problem have also a significant effect on the MCP resulted from the lower-level problem.
The BL-HIA structure is shown in Figure. 1. In BL-HIA structure is also considered for modelling the uncertainty of pool prices, electrical/thermal load demand, and H-MGs buying/selling prices. The proposed bilevel model has been simplified as a one-level problem using KKT method [20] for the sake of convexification.
Decision-Making Process by BL-HIA Structure
The decision-making process in the BL-HIA structure of H-MGs, consumers and retailers can be summarized as shown in Figure. 
Energy exchange in a pool market by the H-MGs:
After stabilizing the H-MGs's performance (an independent or a coalitional operation) and setting supply and demand bids, each H-MG can decide in each time interval of the scheduling horizon on the quantity (to/from other H-MGs in the pool market) to supply the demand of their consumers.
Problem Formulation
The H-MGs's scheduling problem is formulated in a BL-HIA structure. It must be noted that dual variables have been separated by comma after equality and inequality constraints. This section will briefly present models deployed for load shifting, and those representing the interaction among DER, H-MGs, consumers and retailers as well as the coalition among H-MGs. Then, BL-HIA problem formulation will be presented.
DR Objective Function and Constraints
The profit resulting from the participation of consumers in DSM program is calculated from (1):
Equation (3) states that if the value of the demand shifted from time interval t to t is given whenλ MCP tw >λ MCP t'w , then this value is not to exceed the predicted load value at t (i.e., P D,e itw ). Equations (4) and (5) are set to ensure that load shifting is not defined for the same interval. The load shifted from t to t is equivalent to the negative value of the demand deducted from the predicted demand at t as described by
CHP Objective Function and Constraints
The objective is to maximize the profit that can be made through CHP systems's participation in DSM program as in (7):
Equations (8) and (9) state upper and lower limits on the power generated by the CHPs. Equation (10) describes the power generated by the CHPs as a function of the system's efficiency
WT Objective Function and Constraints
The profit resulting from the participation of WT in the DSM program is calculated by (11):
Equation (12) (and similar constraints for determining the limit on DER resources) state programmed power generation of DER controllable and non-controllable resources. Equation (12) is related to the wind turbine electrical power whose maximum limit is a parameter having uncertainty. (13) The profit made by the participation of an electrical/thermal energy storage (ES/TES) system in a DSM program is measured by the objective function in (13) (18) Equations (14)- (18) are the equations governing the operation of ES/TES systems. The operation of ES/TES system is subject to generation limits as in (14) and state of charge limits as in (15)- (18) . It should be noted that (16) states the charge/discharge rate of the ES/TES system.
ES and TES Objective Functions and Constraints
max ES/TES ij = T t=1 P ES/TES ijtw × π ES/TES ijtw
EB Constraints
The profit made by the participation of EB in the DSM program is calculated by (19) :
Eqs. (20) and (21) state the consumed amount of electrical power and the generated heat in the electrical boiler, respectively.
EHP Objective Function and Constraints
The profit made by the participation of EHP in the DSM program is calculated by (22):
Equation (23) describes the relation between the consumed amount of electrical and thermal power generated by the thermal pump. In addition, (24) represents limits on the thermal generation.
GB Objective Function and Constraints
The profit made by the participation of GB in the DSM program is calculated by (25).
Equation (26) states the allowable limits on the heat generation by the gas boiler.
STP Objective Function and Constraints
The profit made by the participation of STP in a DSM program is calculated by Eq. (27):
Equation (28) states the heat generation allowable limits for the operation of a thermal solar panel. In common with a wind turbine, the solar panel thermal maximum limit is also considered to be an uncertainty factor. 
H-MGs's Independent and Coalitional Operation
Two scenarios are implemented to simulate the performance of the proposed BL-HIA structure. These scenarios are described as follows: (P ekitw × π ekitw − P eiktw × π eiktw ) (31) Equation (32) state the profit obtained through the independent operation of the H-MGs ({A}, {B},{C}) . It is worth mentioning that if a DER does not exist in an H-MG, it is not considered in the respective objective function.
Scenario 2
Equations (33)-(34) state the profit obtained through the coalitional operation of H-MGs ({A},{B},{C}) at an upperlevel or a lower-level.
where @ states the coalition among different H-MGs. In addition, coalitional scenario of ({B,AC}) means that the first part (B) is related to the objective function defined at the upper-level and a second part (AC) is related to coalition between H-MGs A and C but defined at a lower level. Equations (35)-(40) state the profit obtained from the coalitional operation of H-MGs A, B, and C at an upper or a lower level.
The right-hand side of these relations is made up of two parts. The first part is related to the objective function defined at the upper level; whereas, the second part is related to the objective function defined at the lower level.
Mathematical Formulation of BL-HIA Structure
In the upper-level problem, each H-MG seeks to maximize its amount of profit. Each upper-level problem's objective function states the income of each H-MG with a lower-level priority for different scenarios. These objective functions which must be maximized have been defined as the sum of the product of electrical/thermal price offers and electrical/thermal powers sold to consumers of each H-MG minus the cost of operation of DERs.
BL-HIA structure includes upper-level problems and a set of lower-level problems under each scenario w. It is noted that if a DER is considered in the upper-level, their constraints from (1) 
The Upper-Level Problem
The upper-level relationship is formulated in this section. The formula expressing the DER relationship given in (1)-(30) are applicable if the related DER is considered to be in the upper level.
Objective function
As was stated earlier, the objective functions of the upperlevel and the lower-level problems can be in the form of (32)-(34). Here, the profit obtained from the coalition or the independent operation of H-MGs with more priority describes the objective function of the upper-level problem. The upperlevel problem is to maximize the expected profit to be made by each H-MG in the case of an individual or a group operation as well as a retailer.
Upper-level problem constraints
(1) − (30)
Equations (1)-(30) are for H-MGs with higher priority. It is very obvious if an H-MG with a higher priority does not include any of the mentioned DERs, then the corresponding constraints of such DERs are to be excluded from the problem formulation. Each H-MG in the upper-level problem makes strategic decisions as per the following:
• Decisions of DERs on supply bid in the lower level of the problem;
• Price strategic offering decisions of consumers in a H-MG on price offers.
The Lower-Level Problem
Each lower-level problem states maximizing the profit of an individual H-MG or a group of H-MGs with a lower priority over different scenarios. The objective of the lower-level problem is to increase the profit of DERs. Thus, CEMS is to reduce the operating cost given limitations ruling over each of the players (i.e., H-MGs, retailer, consumers). Players in BL-HIA structure declare the amount of their generated power and supply bids offered to the CEMS. After simulating the bilevel problem, the electrical and thermal energy prices, the amount of the quantity by each of the players are provided.
Objective function
Considering the cases described in (32)-(34), the objective function of the lower-level problem can be taken from the numerator of the lower-level objective function.
Lower-level problem constraints load shifting and the
DERs Equations (1)-(30) apply for each H-MG with a lower priority. It is very obvious that if an H-MG with a lower priority for example has no CHP, then its constraints must not be considered.
Power Exchange Constraints between H-MGs and Retailers
Equations (42) and (43) show the allowable limits on power exchange between retailers and H-MGs. 
Electrical Balance Constraint

Thermal Balance Constraints
Equation (45) states the relation between the thermal generated and consumed power. The thermal power price in the dual variable grid corresponds to (45).
After the determination of price offers related to electricity and heat and also the amount of electrical and thermal power generation and consumption of each player, the profit made by each of the players is determined.
Since each one of these lower-level problems is continuous and convex, it may be shown by its specific constraints including Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [21] . By using KKT conditions, the constraints for an independent or a coalition operation of H-MGs include the following cases: 
Results and Discussion
The grid under study is shown in Figure. 4. The energy storage systems installed in H-MGs (A and C) are for storing excess electrical and thermal energy generation. The capacity and the number of installed equipment in each H-MG are shown in Table 1 .
In Figure. the energy consumption in such a figure has reduced significantly when H-MGs operate in coalitional structures. Such an energy consumption is the lowest (21%) for a coalitional scenario of ({B,AC}). The energy consumption is at the lowest level (21%) when the coalition scenario corresponds to ({B, AC}). In addition, the reduction in the amount of load shift is a result of a DSM program aimed at achieving a higher payoff for consumers by considering (a) employing load shifting when the value of MCP is high, along with the maximum use of H-MG A interval resources, and (b) reducing the generation cost in an effective manner when load shifting is at a minimum. Moreover, the load profile of H-MGs in a coalition structure ({A,BC}) is the same as that of the alternative coalition structure ({AB,C}) and does not have a significant effect on the consumption level in H-MG A. This trend is completely different from the case in H-MG B. More specifically, during independent operation of H-MGs, the amount of load shift in H-MG B is at its least amount (almost 30% of the total load during 24 hours). Therefore, forming a coalition among H-MGs would increase consumers's participation in the DR program that can reach almost 42% to 50%. Such a reduction in the amount of load shift is a result of a DSM program for reaching more pay-off for consumers by considering criteria such as load shifting when the value of MCP is high, the maximum use of H-MG A interval resources, and also the reduction in the value of generation cost in the best way and with the least amount of load shifting has taken place. Alternatively, the load profile of H-MGs in a coalitional structure ({A,BC}) is the same as that of such H-MGs in an alternative coalitional structure ({AC,B}), and does not have a significant effect on the consumption nature in H-MG A.
The least amount of load shifting is achieved when H-MGs B and A from a coalition in the lower-level of the BL-HIA structure, while having the objective function at an upperlevel of the structure targeting maximizing the profit of H-MG C. Furthermore, these conditions are comparable for the {AC, B} coalition structure, having a similar nature. Under the previous conditions, a substantial share of the excess generation capacity is devoted to meeting H-MG C demand. As a result, a negligible part of such energy has been allocated for supplying responsive loads in H-MG B. It is important to clarify that in the case of H-MG C, the value of the total DR-, in H-MGs independent operating conditions, is significantly greater than the value corresponding to positive demand response (DR+) conditions. While only 17% of time intervals, H-MG C had experienced a DR+ algorithm, such a figure would reach 83% when a negative demand response (DR-) would be experienced. Such a trend in demand response (DR) is comparable to the scenario of coalition structures, where the amount of the total load shift, with the value of DR+ total load during daily performance, are close to each other in terms of the value. The consumer's participation percentage in the H-MG C has improved significantly by forming a coalition between H-MG B and A reaching more than 40% of the times. Only in the coalitional structure {B,AC}, such a value can be minimum (21%).
Furthermore, these conditions are also exactly similar for the {AC,B} coalitional structure and has a similar nature. Under the previous conditions, a big share of the amount of excess generation is spent supplying H-MG C demand.
It is important to clarify that for H-MG C, the value of the total DR-in H-MGs independent operation conditions is much more than such a value when positive demand response (DR+) has taken place.
Such a trend in demand response (DR) is quite similar to the scenario of a coalitional structures, where the amount of the total load shift and the value of DR+ total load during daily performance are close to each other in terms of the value.
The increasing trend of each H-MG income during an independent and a coalitional performance with other H-MGs is shown in Figure. 6. As it is observed from this figure, each structure can be useful for one H-MG and meanwhile can have no benefit for other H-MGs. The best structure, which can be useful for H-MG A, results from forming a coalition among H-MG B and H-MG C excluding the participation of H-MG A in this coalition. These conditions can also be useful for H-MG B on the condition of forming a coalition with H-MG C is in a higher priority of operation. For H-MG C, the highest income is experienced when this H-MG forms a coalition with H-MG A at an initial stage given that H-MG B works independently. Under these conditions, the income of H-MG A is close to the maximum value. For H-MG C, because of the lower the generated power, it is appropriate to form a coalition in all cases with other H-MGs. In all cases in which H-MG C has formed a coalition with other H-MGs, an increasing trend in the income is observed. In comparison, the income resulting from H-MG B when used independently, is significantly improved when compared to other configurations, such as coalition formation with other H-MGs. Furthermore, it is possible, in some cases, for coalition forming to have a detrimental effect on the H-MGs that form part of the coalition.
It is also observed that the coalition among H-MG A and H-MG B at the initial level leads to a significant reduction in the income independently obtained by this H-MG. Moreover, it is desirable to prevent H-MG A from forming a coalition with H-MG B and negotiate with H-MG C to form the coalition.
In comparison, the income resulting from the independent performance of H-MG B is also significant compared to other cases (e.g., coalition formation with other H-MGs) and in some cases forming coalition is harmful for these H-MGs.
For H-MG C, because of the lowness of the generated power, it is appropriate to form a coalition in all cases with other H-MGs.
In Figure. 7a and Figure. 7b show the values of the elec- Such analysis also applies for the thermal MCP for the investigated structures. Finally, we can conclude from the simulation results that forming a coalition among H-MGs existing in one grid will not only have a significant effect on programming and regulating the value of the power generated by the generation resources but also can affect the change in the demand consumption and the behavior of consumers participating in the DR program with a cheaper MCP.
Conclusion
The paper presented an optimum development combined problem of the quantity in a deregulated electricity market environment. A methodology has been presented for investigating the possibility of increasing incomes of H-MGs, consumers and retailers existing in a multiple H-MGs. These Participants's performances had been properly modelled in the market environment. A H-MG programmer tries to increase its income as long as it is freely negotiating energy exchange with DER resources and its consumers. It can also put the possibility of forming a coalition with other H-MGs on its agenda. H-MGs seek to estimate the value of the power generated by DERs and also supply/demand bids to consumers. Meanwhile, the possibility of forming coalition among H-MGs with the aim of maximizing the income in an independent or a coalitional operation in a scheduling horizon is also investigated. In this way, the H-MGs encounter pool prices uncertainties, and the value of electrical and thermal loads. Furthermore, if the supply bid of one H-MG is not competitive enough, consumers may choose another H-MG for supplying their demand. For investigating how forming a coalition among H-MGs can affect the market behaviour and H-MGs's gained income, different scenarios were presented. These scenarios were solved through a bilevel structure which can be transformed into a one NLP problem. The proposed model did not only present solutions of higher income achievements of each H-MG in an independent or a coalitional operation, but also provides the higher income/lower cost for each of the retailers/consumers relative to a single level model.
The BL-HIA structure has presented an adequate framework for modelling both H-MGs reaction for a better par-ticipation in generation and effect on electricity price, and also competition increase among H-MGs and retailers. In the upper-level problem, H-MGs change their capacity with the aim of maximizing their income and by predicting the behaviour of other competitors (H-MGs) resulting from the lower-level problem, and noting quantities and prices proposed by DERs and consumers. An Optimum pricing strategy was implemented to enable the market dynamic behavior on H-MGs decisions. Furthermore, a daily generation scheduling was presented. For a selected case study, an infinite number of Nash equilibrium was observed for the case where no players tend to unilaterally change their pricing strategies. In these obtained equilibrium points, the total expected profit of all players does not change. Although it is distributed among them.
Simulation results showed that by forming a coalition among H-MGs, their profit, the demand value of supplied load and the DERs generated power existing in those H-MGs may change. Furthermore, computational simulations showed the convergence of the proposed model for solving real problems and simultaneously presenting solutions for raising H-MGs and retailers income and also reducing market clearing price. The following results can be extracted from the structure of the developed model:
• The bilevel model hierarchical structure for modelling the strategic behavior of each H-MG in reaction to the behavioral change and decision making of other H-MGs and their supply bid. Furthermore, the proposed structure can effectively encourage consumers to participate in the electricity market and affecting them using the DSM program.
• It had been shown that energy exchange among H-MGs and retailers, in addition to increasing the profit of each player, would have a significant impact on levelling the load and reducing consumers's power consumption lack of support during the consumption peak period.
Appendices Applying KKT conditions to the lower-level problem
As stated before, since the lower-level problem is a linear problem, KKT conditions can be applied to it. The constraints obtained from the derivative of Lagrange expression relative to lower-level variables include the following relations: 
